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Abstract
As space technology develops into more sophisticated areas such as space planes and a
variety of space-based platforms with the potential capability to carry weapon systems, the
issue of space as a theatre of war is a now a pressing issue that needs to be addressed.
Underpinning this Article is a discussion of the militarization and weaponization of outer
space and its intersection with the international regime on the use of force. It juxtaposes
technological advances in the military utility of space and the tenets of the UN Charter
against the landscape of the "peaceful purposes" mantra that underpins the Space Law
regime. The Article highlights the fact that the international legal arena now has a new
game in the making for which it is in many ways ill equipped to handle as the ambitious
military programs of extant space powers seek to utilize the full spectrum of space tech-
nology for both defensive and offensive purposes. At the heart of the Article is the argu-
ment that there is a need to analyze extant principles on the use of force in order to
address the lacunae in the current regime on the use of force as a means to enhance its
utility.
I. Introduction
On January 11, 2007, the Chinese military launched a KT-1 rocket that successfully
destroyed a redundant Chinese Feng Yun 1-C weather satellite, which it had launched in
1999, in Low Earth Orbit approximately 800 kilometers above the earth. As details of the
test emerged, governments from around the world, including the United States, Canada,
United Kingdom and Australia, all raised diplomatic concerns as to the nature of the test
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and its ramifications.' The Chinese remained tight-lipped in the next few days following
the test. Finally, twelve days after the test and in the face of increasing anxiety amongst
the international community, the Chinese Government acknowledged its existence. In
seeking to allay concerns regarding the military nature of the test as a potential harbinger
of a space arms race, as well as criticism that it was inconsistent with the "peaceful pur-
poses" spirit underpinning the space law regime, the Chinese Government reaffirmed that
it was committed to the "peaceful development of outer space." 2
In another development, just ten days after the Chinese satellite test, the Czech Gov-
ernment confirmed that it would be willing to host a large U.S. military site for the Penta-
gon's missile shield system, involving the construction of a radar facility east of Prague.3
The implication and practical import of the Czech Government statement, coming so
soon after the Chinese test, adds further to an increasingly troubling perspective, particu-
larly when one considers that just five years earlier the United States had withdrawn from
the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, a significant bilateral treaty.4 The ABM treaty
expressly prohibits development, testing and deployment of sea-based, air-based,
space-based, and mobile land-based ABM systems.5 It was meant as an effective measure
to limit anti-ballistic missile systems and thus a substantial factor in curbing the race in
strategic offensive arms.6 The key reason given by the United States was that the treaty
was outdated. 7 However, it is clear that the withdrawal provides the United States with
few legal obstacles in developing strategic weapon systems, in particular space-based de-
vices critical to its National Missile Defense program, and American space superiority.
With China ascendant in the twenty-first century, the space-technology rivalry, particu-
larly its military utility, among the space powers appears to be intensifying. Recall that in
2000, China unveiled an ambitious ten-year space program.8 While one of the strongest
immediate motivations for this program appears to be political prestige, China's space
efforts almost certainly will contribute to improved military space systems. 9 With the
1. In voicing its dismay at the test, a spokesperson for the United Kingdom Government was reported to
have said:
We don't believe that this does contravene international law. What we are concerned about,
however, is lack of consultation and we believe that this development of this technology and the
manner in which this test was conducted is inconsistent with the spirit of China's statements to
the UN and other bodies on the military use of space.
Ewen MacAskill, Michael White & Brian Whitaker, Western Protests Flood in over Chinese Satellite Killer, TUE
GUARDIAN, Jan. 20, 2007, at 18.
2. BBC News, China Confirms Satellite Downed, BBC NEWS ONLINE (2007), http://www.bbc.co.uk.
3. Ian Traynor, Czechs Give Go-Ahead for U.S. 'Son of Star Wan,' THE GUARDIAN, Jan. 22, 2007, at 14.
4. Colin L. Powell, Secretary of State, U.S. Department of State, Statement on the Achievement of the Final
Reductions under the START Treaty (2001), http://www.state.gov/secretary/former/powelLlremarks/2001/dec/
6674.html.
5. Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, U.S.-U.S.S.R., art. V, May 26, 1972, 23
U.S.T. 3462, (emphasis added) [hereinafter ABM Treaty].
6. Id.
7. John Diamond, Missile Pact on Brink: U.S. Says Imminent Testing May Violate ABM Treaty, CuICAcO
TRIBUNE, July 13, 2001, at 1.
8. Mark Wade, China, ENCYCLOPEDIA ASTRONAUTIA, http://www.astronautix.com/articles/china.html
(last visited May 17, 2006).
9. Leonard David, Pentagon Report: Cbina's Space Warfare Tactics Aimed at U.S. Supremacy (2003), http://
www.space.com/news/china-dod 030801 .html.
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United States actively pursuing a National Missile Defense program, in 2003, a Chinese
military official commented that China's army had already introduced the concept of
"space force strength,"0 in apparent reference to a similar U.S. military concept. 1 An
indication that Chinese space programs are at least partially driven by military and secur-
ity considerations is the fact that the Chinese space program has always been under the
command of senior officers of the People's Liberation Army.' 2
These stark reminders of the military aspects of space technology raise questions of
international law and the current legal regime regulating the military uses of outer space.
Moreover, as well as highlighting issues arising from the specific United Nations interna-
tional treaties and resolutions that form an integral part of the international law of outer
space, the utilization of space technology, in this respect, raises broader concerns regard-
ing the "weaponization" of outer space and the use of such weapons in the context of an
armed attack or as an act of self-defense, as recognized within the framework of the
United Nations Charter and the international legal regime that regulates of the use of
force.
The increasing weaponization of outer space poses not only difficult legal questions but
also represents a clear and present danger to international peace and security. There is
already a great fear of an arms race being undertaken in space, with the latest develop-
ments in both Beijing and Washington adding further fuel to that fire. In this context, one
can certainly envisage that the deliberate destruction of, say, a communications or weather
satellite by a missile such as was launched by China or like those that could be launched as
part of the U.S. missile shield system, even if not resulting in any immediate civilian casu-
alties, could have a devastating impact on a community, country, or even region of the
world. Millions of lives and livelihoods could potentially be affected, economies de-
stroyed, and essential services incapacitated.
Yet, although the position might not be as categorical as the United Kingdom spokes-
person suggested in the quote referred to above, the legal regime that governs the possible
weaponization of outer space is, as this article will discuss, unsatisfactory, capable of differ-
ing interpretations and largely protective of a State's sovereign right to utilize force in
self-defense-even if that may involve the use of space technology-if it is deemed appro-
10. Id.
11. In 1998, the United States Space Command (USSPACECOM) issued its Long Range Plan outlining
the U.S. military vision for control of space and developing a capacity to project force front space. The first
two mission statements of USSPACECOM's Long Range Plan are identified as "space support" and "force
enhancement," meaning the use of space assets to facilitate military operations of combat forces on land, sea,
and air. The next two mission statements of "space control" and "force application" are more controversial, as
they suggest the weaponization of space, and are most closely related to combat in a future theatre of military
space operations. Overall, these four mission areas encapsulate "space control." U.S. SPACE COMMAND,
LONG RANcE PLAN: LiPL cEUN-'rING USSPACECOM VISION FOR 2020 (1998), http://www.fas.org/spp/
military/docops/usspac/lrp.toc.htm. More significant was its sister document issued in 1999 by the U.S. De-
partment of Defense (DoD), which expanded upon and reinforced themes raised by USSPACECOM's Long
Range Plan. Among addressing other space issues, the DoD policy states: "Purposeful interference with U.S.
space systems will be viewed as an infringement on our sovereign rights. The US may take all appropriate
self-defense measures, including, if directed by the National Command Authorities (NCA), the use of force,
to respond to such an infringement on US rights." DEi'r. OF DEFENSE, DIRECTIvE 3100.10: SPACE POLICY
(1999).
12. Agence Frace-Presse, Moscow, Kremlin Voices Concern at U.S. Conventional Missile Plans (2006), http://
www.defensenews.com/story.php?F= 1767408&C=airwar.
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priate. 13 In the end, although there are some fundamental underlying principles of inter-
national law that are relevant to the issue of space weaponization, it is by no means clear
that the deployment of such weapons, or their use as an act of force, are proscribed in
certain circumstances.
This article seeks to discuss some of the broad questions, particularly in the light of
ever-expanding military uses of outer space and the significance, particularly to the major
powers, of the military and strategic value associated with space technology superiority.
This article first looks at the historical efforts of the two main protagonists, the United
States and the Soviet Union/Russia, to develop space military technology, recognizing the
unique strategic values this offered. It then highlights the relevant provisions of both
international space law and the regime prohibiting the use of force under the United
Nations Charter that may apply to the weaponization of outer space and proceeds to
discuss the interaction of these legal principles to gauge whether and how they might, if at
all, have a practical effect in curbing the growing threat posed by space weaponization,
including in circumstances of a cyber-attack.
The authors conclude that, in light of the unique features of outer space and the very
significant consequences that could emerge from a space arms race or, even worse, a
"space war," the principles that do exist may not be specific enough to provide appropriate
regulation for the increasingly diverse ways that outer space could be used during the
course of armed conflict. It follows that there is a growing need to reach a consensus on
additional space law regulation directly applicable to the increasing threat represented by
the weaponization of outer space and its potential for use as a direct theatre of war.
TI. The Historical Quest for Strategic Military Advantage in Outer Space
In order to evaluate the practical relevance of current international (space) law princi-
ples to the issue of space weaponization, it is necessary to first examine the historical
development of space as a military area and the reasons behind this. The United States
and the Soviet Union led the way in conquering outer space in the 1950s through a series
of initiatives that included satellites, spacecraft launches, and nuclear detonations. In Oc-
tober 1957, humankind finally could regard space as a reachable frontier with the launch
by the Soviet Union of Sputnik I, which proceeded to orbit the Earth. Almost immedi-
ately, important principles of space law were born. As Judge Lachs in the North Sea
Continental Shelf Cases observed:
[T]he first instruments that men sent into outer space traversed the air space of States
and circled above them in outer space, yet the launching States sought no permission,
nor did the other States protest. This is how the freedom of movement into outer
space, and in it, came to be established and recognised as law within a remarkably
short period of time.' 4
13. In this regard, one only need to recall Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory
Opinion, 1996 I.CJ. 226, 245 (July 8, 1996) where by a majority with the President's casting vote, the Inter-
national Court of Justice, while noting that the threat or use of a nuclear weapon should comply with the
requirements of international law relating to armed conflict, particularly the principles of international hu-
manitarian law, was unable to categorically state that the threat or use of nuclear weapons would in every
circumstance constitute a violation of international law.
14. North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den.; F.R.G. v. Neth.), 1969 I.CJ. 3,230 (Feb. 20).
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In the same year as Sputnik 1, the United States successfully undertook nuclear detona-
tions in space. 15 It was already apparent that there were an increasing range of possible
uses of outer space, with the only limitation being one's imagination and the development
of appropriate technology. Almost as soon as Sputnik I was launched, the international
community became concerned about the possibility for use of outer space for military
purposes as well as the fear that it could perhaps ultimately be used as a theatre of war,
particularly in the context of the prevailing Cold War. In December 1958, the United
Nations emphasized the need "to avoid the extension of present national rivalries into this
new field." 16
By 1961, the General Assembly had recommended that international law and the
United Nations Charter 17 apply to "outer space and celestial bodies."' 8 This was re-
peated in General Assembly Resolution 1962,19 which set forth a number of important
principles ultimately embodied in the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of
States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and other Celestial
Bodies (the "Outer Space Treaty"). 20 Specific reference in the Outer Space Treaty to the
United Nations Charter, such as Article III's provision that activities in the exploration
and use of outer space shall be carried out "in accordance with international law, including
the Charter of the United Nations," was important given that the maintenance of interna-
tional peace and security is the underlying principle of the system established under the
Charter. 21 It was assumed that, through the application of Article III of the Outer Space
Treaty, the prohibition on the use of force contained in Article 2, Section 4 of the Charter,
which represents a crucial element in the regulation of international relations, would be
equally applicable to the use of outer space. 22
In 1961, the Soviet Union launched the first manned spaceflight when it placed Yuri
Gagarin into orbit. The United States followed suit in 1962. This further ratcheted up
the scale of the technological race between the United States and the Soviet Union and
marked the genesis of a technological race that would soon metamorphose into a (largely)
terrestrial arms race, with each seeking to assert dominance in space exploration and us-
age. As the Cold War confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union
intensified, the military utility outer space offered was not lost on those nations. Research
15. A Tass news agency announcement on August 27, 1957, which reported the successful test of the Soviet
Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile (ICBM), also included reference to "a series of explosions of nuclear and
thermonuclear (hydrogen) weapons... set off at great altitudes." Myres S. McDougal, Harold D. Lasswell &
Ivan A. Vlasic, LAW AND PUBLIC ORDER IN SPACE 389, n. 77 (1963).
16. G.A. Res. 1348 (XIII), U.N. GAOR, 13th Sess.,Supp. No. 18b U.N. Doc. A/4090 (Dec. 13, 1958).
17. UN Charter, Jun. 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, 892 U.N.T.S. 119.
18. G.A. Res. 1721 (XVI), l(b), U.N. GAOR, 16th Sess., 1085th plen. mtg. (Dec. 20, 1961).
19. G.A. Res. 1962 (XVIII), 1 4, U.N. GAOR, 18th Sess., Supp. No. 15, 11280th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/
5515 (Dec. 13, 1963).
20. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space,
Including the Moon and other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U. S.T. 2410, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 (hereinaf-
ter Outer Space Treaty].
21. Id. The first "Purpose" of the United Nations specified in U.N. Charter Article 1, paragraph 1 begins
with the words: "To maintain international peace and security."
22. U.N. Charter art. 2(4) provides: "All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other
manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations."
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and development of state of the art technology to capitalize on the strategic advantages,
perceived or real, of outer space began.
In the early 1980s, then U.S. President Ronald Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative
(SDI) provided a measure of legitimacy to many ideas that were formerly seen as impossi-
ble.23 Since the announcement by President Reagan of the SDI,24 an arms race in outer
space has come to mean something more, such as the introduction of new, futuristic weap-
ons, including beam, kinetic, electronic, and laser weapons into the space environment, as
well as Space Operated Vehicles (SOVs) with the capability to launch ordnances. Several
decades after humankind's conquest of space, there has not yet been a case of force being
actively used in outer space by one nation against another. However, states have under-
taken what might be termed passive military activities in outer space since the advent of
space technology, and outer space is increasingly being used as part of active engagement
in the conduct of armed conflict. Not only is the information gathered from outer space-
through, for example, the use of remote satellite technology and communications satel-
lites-used to plan military engagement on Earth, but space assets are now used to direct
military activity and represent an integral part of the military hardware of the major
powers.
Given the increasing global reliance on space systems and increasing militarization and
weaponization of outer space, its evolution into a distinct theatre of military operations
appears increasingly imminent. Several commentators have gone even further and opined
that space warfare is, in fact, inevitable. 25 A harbinger of things to come was flagged by
the release in 1998 of the Long Range Plan by the United States Space Command (USS-
PACECOM) outlining the U.S. military vision for control of space and developing a ca-
pacity to project force from space. 26 More significant was its sister document issued in
1999 by United States Department of Defense, which expanded and reinforced themes
raised by USSPACECOM.27
In the 21st Century, the United States is preparing its next military objective-a doc-
trine to establish "space superiority. ' 28 Following the attacks of September 11, 2001, the
U.S. Administration issued a landmark policy paper in which it emphasized the need for
"[i]nnovation within the armed forces [which] will rest on experimentation with new ap-
proaches to warfare, strengthening joint operations, exploiting U.S. intelligence advan-
tages, and taking full advantage of science and technology." 29 As an integral part of this
policy, it was necessary to maintain technological supremacy so as to "dominate the space
23. On March 23, 1983, President Reagan announced his decision to "embark on a program to counter the
awesome Soviet missile threat with measures that are defensive." U.S. President Ronald Reagan, President's
Speech on Military Spending and a New Defense, N.Y. TNIMES, Mar. 24, 1983 at, A20.
24. Mary McGory, The Stars Spoke on Capitol Hill, WASH. Posi, May 5, 1988, at 2.
25. See, e.g., lole M. De Angelis, Legal and Political Implications of Offensives Actions from and against the Space
Segment, 45 PROCEEDINGS OF THE COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 197 (2002).
26. U.S. SPACE Co.uANDsr, spra note 11, at 21.
27. DEPT. OF DEFENSE, supra note 11.
28. Air Force doctrine is evolving to reflect technical and operational innovations. AIR FORCE DOCTINE
DOCUMENT 2-2.1, the Air Force's first doctrine publication on counterspace operations, provides opera-
tional guidance in the use of air and space power to ensure space superiority. Def. Technical Info. Ctr., AIR
FORCE DOCTRINE DOCUMENT 2-2.1: COUNTERSPACE (Aug. 2, 2004), available at http://www.dtic.mi/doc-
trine/je/service-pubs/afdd2_2_l .pdf.
29. The White House, The National Security of the United States of America, at 30 (Sept. 17, 2002), http://
www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html.
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dimension of military operations." 30 This necessitates having "the ability to defend the
homeland, conduct information operations, ensure U.S. access to distant theaters, and
protect critical U.S. infrastructure and assets in outer space." 3'
Space superiority, if in fact it is truly achievable, would ensure the freedom to operate in
the space medium while denying the same to an adversary and, like air superiority, cannot
be taken for granted.32 The new doctrine means that preemptive strikes against enemy
satellites could become "crucial ... steps in any military operation." 33 The United States
Air Force (USAF) believes that seizing control of the "final frontier" is essential for mod-
ern warfare, noting that "[sipace superiority provides freedom to attack as well as freedom
from attack."'34 Space and air superiority is now deemed crucial in any military opera-
tion." 35 In this regard, the concept of counterspace operations has been articulated pre-
mised on the notion of destroying enemy satellites in the event of combat to improve the
chances of victory.3 6
The idea of space warfare has given rise to some disturbing rhetoric. In 2001, a com-
mission headed by former U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld suggested that an
"attack on elements of U.S. space systems during a crisis or conflict should not be consid-
ered an improbable act." 37 The report went on to (in)famously warn of the possibility of a
"Space Pearl Harbor"-a surprise attack on the space assets of the United States. 38 More
worryingly, space warfare has developed beyond mere talk and is now brewing into a
potent reality. Despite its positive aspects, the existing space law regime is inadequate to
deal with the specific challenges posed by these developments, and it is with this in mind
that the following sections of this article juxtapose the weaponization of outer space and
the United Nations Charter regime on the use of force. Despite the fact that the space
law regime is premised on the basic principle of peaceful purposes, outer space has the
dubious distinction of already being a highly militarized environment.
30. Sa'id Mosteshar, Militarization of Outer Space: Legality and Implications for the Future of Space Law, 47
PROCEEDINGS OF THE COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 473, 77 n.1-2 (2004).
31. The White House, supra note 29.
32. John P. Jumper, Foreword to AIR FORCE DOCTRINE DOCUMErT 2-2.1: COUNTERSPACE OPEREA-





37. U.S. DEPT. OF DEF., REPORT OF THE COMMISSION TO ASSESS UNITED STATES NATIONAL SECUR-
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IM. Space Law and the United Nations Charter: Peeling a Legal Onion?
A. UNITED NATIONS CHARTER: PRACTICAL RELEVANCE AND APPLICABILITY TO
OUTER SPACE?
The space regime as it now exists rests upon five principal United Nations multilateral
treaties on outer space, 39 supplemented by several other treaties (not specifically directed
to outer space) and a series of bilateral agreements of international significance, primarily
between the United States and the Soviet Union. The five space law treaties evolved from
a series of General Assembly resolutions and declarations following the creation by the
United Nations General Assembly of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space
(COPUOS) to study problems of governing outer space.40
The issue of whether general principles of international law apply to outer space is still
one of contention. On one hand, there is the extreme position held by some commenta-
tors that seeks to preclude in toto the applicability of general principles of international
law (lex generalis). Proponents of this position argue that since the Outer Space Treaty
does not enumerate exactly which "general principles" apply to outer space, certain funda-
mental provisions of international law, specifically those concerning the use of force in
self-defense, cannot and should not be made applicable to outer space on the basis that
they are inconsistent with the principles of the Outer Space Treaty itself.41
On the other hand, some leading scholars, including Professors Ivan A. Vlasic and Man-
fred Lachs, contend that a proper reading of Article III of the Outer Space Treaty makes
the lex generalis-including rules of customary law-and the United Nations Charter
applicable to outer space.42
We concur with the view presented by Vlasic and Lachs, not only because it is by far the
more well articulated and popular position, but also because it accords with the reality of
the development of customary principles relating to space law-the use of analogy to
other international legal spheres as a basis for development. This position, however,
should be tempered with the reality that Article Ill is not an automatic, blanket extension
to outer space and celestial bodies of the entire realm of international law but, rather,
extends relevant principles, including the United Nations Charter.43 Christopher M. Pe-
tras notes that this position does not encompass lex specialis, stating that certain rules of
international law and/or provisions of the Charter cannot, by definition, apply to outer
space since they are by their nature lex specialis for certain environments. 44 Petras thus
39. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 20; Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts
and the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space, Apr. 22, 1968, 19 U.S.T. 7570, 672 U.N.T.S. 119;
Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, Mar. 29, 1972, 19 U.S.T. 7570,
961 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter Liability Convention]; Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into
Outer SpaceJan. 14, 1975, 28 U.S.T. 695, 1023 U.N.T.S. 15; Agreement Governing the Activities of States
on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Dec. 18, 1979, 1363 U.N.T.S. 21 (hereinafter Moon Agreement].
40. GA Res. 1348 (XIII), 1 3, s-upra note 16. For an examination of COPUOS working procedures, see
Michel Bour~ly, The Contribtions Made by International Organizations to the Formation of Space Law, 10 J.
SPACF L. 139, 143-45 (1982).
41. Sudhakar Chandrasekharan, The Space Treaty, 7 INDIAN J. INrT'L L. 61, 63 (1967).
42. Christopher M. Petras, Space Force Alpha" Military Use of the International Space Station and the Concept
Of"Peaceful Purposes," 53 A.F. L. REv. 135, 155-56 (2002).
43. Id. at 156.
44. Id.
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further clarifies the VIasic and Lachs position and, in doing so, makes it even more appeal-
ing both legally and practically.45
The sentiments underlying the United Nations Charter were further cemented by the
restrictions imposed in relation to nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction
(WMDs) by Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty, although, as has been well documented
by leading commentators and is further discussed later in this article, this provision in and
of itself does not represent a complete restriction on the placement of weapons in outer
space.46 Indeed, there have been, from time to time, proposals to amend Article IV in
order to enhance these restrictions, but this has not (yet) eventuated. 47
The prevalent view is that the United Nations Charter, including the legal regulation of
force provisions, applies in outer space, particularly in view of the fact that, as stated
above, Article m of the Outer Space Treaty-the most significant treaty on outer space
law and often referred to as the "Space Magna Carta"-specifically references the Char-
ter.4 8 A succinct survey of some leading commentators further reinforces this view. Be-
ginning in 1968, Professor J.E.S. Fawcett asserted that no provision of the Charter or rule
of customary law imposes "any upper limit above the surface of the Earth on the legiti-
mate exercise of the right of self-defense." 49 The position was reiterated two years later
by Professors S. Houston Lay and Howard J. Taubenfeld, who strongly echoed the posi-
tion by Fawcett: "Under present treaty rules and/or customary law, as demonstrated in
practice, national statements, and United Nations resolutions ... [i]nternational law, in-
cluding the United Nations Charter where appropriate, applies to acts in outer space.
This expressly includes the right of self defense."S0 The position of these commentators
received the approval of the Legal Sub-Committee of COPUOS, which rejected the idea
that the right of self-defense is not applicable in regard to outer space.5' In practical
terms, this conclusion means it is unlawful for a state to interfere in a hostile manner with
the assets of another state in outer space,52 and the exception to the bar on the use of force
under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter likewise applies in outer space.5 3 Thus, a
state may legally use force to defend itself against hostile actions should the situation arise.
45. Id.
46. Gyula Gil, "Threat or Use of Force"-Observations to Article 2 of the U.N. Charter and Article III of the
Outer Space Treaty, 17 J. SPACE L. 54, 57 (1989).
47. See Vladimir Bogomolov, Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space: The Deliberations in the Conference on
Disarmament in 1993, 21 J. SPACE L. 141 (1993) (referring to a failed Venezuelan proposal to amend Article
IV).
48. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 20, art. III.
49. J.E.S. FAWCETT, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF OUTER SPACE 39 (1968).
50. S. HousTON LAY & HOWARD J. TAUBENFELD, THE LAW RELATING To AcTm-InES OF MAN IN
SPACE 73 (1970).
51. BRUCE A. HURWIA'TZ, THE LEGALrIY OF SPACE MILITARIZATION72 (1986). See also GENNADII
ZHUKOV, INTERNATIONAL SPACE LAW 89 (1976) (asserting that states can lawfully use force in or through
outer space in the process of self-defense).
52. Ivan A. Vlasic, Space Law and the Military Applications of Space Technology, in PERSPECrIVES ON INTER-
NATIONAL LAW (N. Jaenruliyana ed., 1995); see also Philip D. O'Neill, Jr., The Development of International
Law Governing the Military Use of Outer Space, in NATIONAL INTERESTS AND THE MILITARY USE OF SPACE
169, 177 (William J. Dutch ed., 1984).
53. U.N. Charter Article 51 provides, inter alia: "Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent
right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Na-
tions, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security."
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B. "PEACEFUL PURPOSES": ACCEPTED LN PRINCIPLE, CONTESTED LN SUBSTANCE
It is estimated that more than half of all American and Russian (and former Soviet
Union) spacecrafts presently orbiting the Earth have served and continue to serve military
purposes. Both of these space-faring powers, however, have steadfastly described all of
their space missions as "peaceful. '5 4 The new space power, China, also adheres to this
description. In the past, it has been relatively easy to take issue with these assertions in
circumstances where a space object is launched with the single purpose of conducting
military activities. The crux of the present-day problem, however, is that the majority of
those devices involved in military uses of outer space have a dual purpose not only in the
sense that they are both offensive and defensive, but also because they carry out both
civilian/commercial activities as well as military ones. This concept of a dual use satellite
is by now well-known in space parlance, giving rise to further difficult legal issues.
In addition, there has traditionally been a great semantic and interpretational battle-
ground regarding the meaning of the "peaceful purposes" principle that underpins the
international space law regime. Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty, which states "[t]he
Moon and other celestial bodies shall be used ...exclusively for peaceful purposes,"55
specifies what is seemingly a very important component of international space law. This
principle is also reflected in Article III of the Moon Agreement. Even before the finaliza-
tion of the international space law treaties, the General Assembly recognized "the com-
mon interest of all mankind in the progress of exploration and use of outer space for
peaceful purposes" through the 1963 "Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the Ac-
tivities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space."'56
However, almost as soon as this fundamental principle was enunciated, disagreement
and confusion arose as to exactly what was meant by it. The United States, from the very
beginning of the Space Age up to the present, has maintained the official position that
"peaceful" means "non-aggressive" and not "non-military," 57 except for some of its earli-
est statements on the international control of space activities, which appeared to support
the proposition that outer space should be used exclusively for non-military purposes.58
Apart from those early suggestions, the overriding goal of U.S. space policy during the
pre-Outer Space Treaty era was to gain international recognition of the legality of recon-
naissance satellites while simultaneously discouraging military space activities that
threatened those assets.5 9 It is therefore not surprising that the traditional, almost dog-
matic interpretation of peaceful by the United States as synonymous with non-aggressive
54. Daniel Goedhuis, Some Recent Trends in the Interpretation and the Implementation of the Rules of Interna-
tional Space Law, 19 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 213, 226 (1981).
55. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 20, at art. IV.
56. G.A. Res. 1962 (XVIII), supra note 19. This provision is repeated in Outer Space Treaty, supra note 20,
pmbl. para. 2.
57. Bin Cheng, The Legal Status of Outer Space and Releveant Issues: Delimitation of Outer Space and Definition
of Peaceful Use, 11 J. SPACE L. 89,99 (1983); See also Richard Morgan, Military Use of Commercial Communica-
tion Satellites: A New Look at the Outer Space Treaty and "Peacefid Purposes", 60 J. AIR L. & Com. 237, 303-04
(1994).
58. See, e.g., National Security Council Action No. 1553 (Nov. 21, 1956), quoted in PAUL B. STARES, THE
MILITARIZATION OF SPACE: U.S. POLICY, 1945-1984, 54 (1988).
59. Christopher M. Petras, The Use of Force in Response to Cyber-Attack on Commercial Space Systems-Reex-
amining "Self-Defense" in Outer Space in Light of the Convergence of U.S. Military and Commercial Space Activities,
67 J. AIR L & Cos. 1213, 1253 (2002).
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reflects and upholds that policy. The interpretation is regarded by many as a corollary to
and in conflict with the meaning of the terms peace and aggression found in the United
Nations Charter. 60 By the same token, Vlasic notes that "[tihe term 'peaceful ' [pur-
poses] ...was interpreted by the United States to mean .. .[that] all military uses are
permitted and lawful as long as they remain 'non-aggressive' as per Article 2 (4) of the
UN Charter, which prohibits 'the threat or use of force." 6'
In contrast, as part of a diplomatic offensive to ban U.S. reconnaissance satellites, the
Soviet Union initially took the view, at least publicly, that peaceful purposes meant
non-military and that all military activities in space were thus prohibited, despite the fact
that it was undoubtedly already engaged in and contemplating the potential for military
uses of outer space. Although the Soviet government consistently maintained that all of
its activities in space were peaceful and scientific, its official line eventually softened as its
military satellite programs came into their own. By the spring of 1958, less than a year
after the launch of Sputnik I, the anticipation of the availability of reconnaissance satellites
triggered a decisive shift in Soviet policy towards the view that space could and should be
used for peaceful rather than non-military purposes, leading to the plausible conclusion
that the Soviet Union "acquiesced to the United States interpretation," at least at that
time.62
The U.S. position on Article III of the Moon Agreement is that it permits military
activities that are not aggressive, that is, those undertaken for peaceful purposes. However,
[t]he reference to peaceful purposes in this Article does not add any clarification to
the contradictory interpretations given to the term "peaceful purposes" in the Outer
Space Treaty. The Moon Agreement adds little, if anything, to the provisions of the
Outer Space Treaty in the realm of military space activities.
63
Jonathan Halpern adds:
The argument for "non-aggressive" purposes is that since defensive systems create a
deterrent that ultimately promotes peace, only the aggressive use of such systems will
threaten their peaceful status. Given that all weapons systems are potential deter-
rents, this view allows states to assert that deploying arms (nuclear weapons and
weapons of mass destruction excluded) on the moon and in its orbit and trajectory
constitutes a "peaceful purpose" use of the moon. 64
The reference in Article 111(2) to "any other hostile act or threat of hostile act" suggests
that under the Moon Agreement a peaceful use will be a non-hostile use.65 Perhaps the
most significant feature of that treaty is its articulation of the "common heritage of man-
60. Ivan A. Vlasic, The Legal Aspects of Peacefid and Non-Peacefid Uses of Outer Space, in PEACEFUL AND
NON-PEACEFUL USES OF SPACE PROBLEMS OF DEFINITION FOR THE PREVENTFION OF AN ARMS RACE 37,
40 (Bhupendra Jasani ed., 1991).
61. Id.
62. Petras, supra note 60, at 1254.
63. John Kunich, Planetary Defense: The Legality of Global Survival, 41 A.F. L. REV. 119, 157-58 (1997).
64. Jonathan Halpern, Antisatellite Weaponry: The High Road to Destruction, 3 B.U. INT'L L.J. 167, 193
(1985).
65. Moon Agreement, supra note 40, art. 1(2) (providing, inter alia,"[a]ny threat or use of force or any
other hostile act or threat of hostile act on the moon is prohibited").
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kind" concept. Article XI begins with the following: "The moon and its natural resources
are the common heritage of mankind." 66 This is an important principle in the context of
the management of the resources of outer space but in and of itself may not serve to
restrict in any meaningful way the utilization of outer space for military purposes.
Recall that during the United Nations Conference on the Exploration and Peaceful
Uses of Outer Space held in Vienna in August 1968, many important principles were
formulated. The Conference drew together seventy-eight states and a large number of
international organizations, reviewing a decade of space research in practical applica-
tions-communications, meteorology, navigation, and education-and practical benefits
as well as economic and legal questions pertaining to international cooperation. During
the discussions, the question of whether to permit military equipment and personnel in
space and on celestial bodies sparked a lively but heated debate. Several delegations, in-
cluding that of the Soviet Union, initially opposed even the peaceful use of military assets
on celestial bodies. 67 The United States, however, maintained that "the use of military
personnel and equipment for scientific research or any other peaceful purpose should not
be prohibited"68 because military resources "played an indispensable role [in space activ-
ity] and would continue to be an essential part of future space programmes." 69 This view
was supported by the United Kingdom. 70 Ultimately, the Anglo-American view pre-
vailed. The final treaty embodied the understanding that the actual end use of a piece of
equipment used in space is more important than its military origin or potential military
capabilities.7'
Yet, at the same time it was agreed that, as previously mentioned, Article IV of the
Outer Space Treaty would provide that outer space shall be "used exclusively for peaceful
purposes." However, this provision, while on first reading may appear relatively clear, is
also a semantic and interpretational battleground. The impact of its ambiguity becomes
clear when one considers the Reagan "Star Wars" program. It was premised on
non-peaceful or aggressive uses but geared towards the purpose of defending the United
States, a peaceful purpose of self-defense. It follows that "use" and "purpose" acquire a
strong legal connotation. Thus, it has been argued the practical effect of Article IV of the
Outer Space Treaty is that both military and non-military applications may be deployed
for peaceful purposes anywhere in space. 72
Whether a particular technology is permitted in space also depends both upon the in-
tended use of the technology and whether it is to be used in the vacuum of outer space or
66. Id. art. XI(I).
67. Barry J. Hurewitz, Non-Proliferation and Free Access to Outer Space: The Dual-Use Dilemma of the Outer
Space Treaty and the Missile Technology Control Regime, 9 HIGH TECH L.J. 211, 217 (1994).
68. U.N. GAOR, C.O.P.U.O.S., Legal Subcomm., 5th Sess., 62nd mtg., at 6, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/
SR.62 (1966) (statement by U.S. Ambassador Goldberg), reprinted in 3 MANTUAL OF SPACE LAW, 59
(Nandasiri Jasentuliyana ed., 1981).
69. The U.S. delegation favored a non-restrictive approach to the use of military assets in space for peace-
ful purposes. See Paul Dembling & Daniel Arons, The Evolution of the Outer Space Treaty, 33 J. AIR L. & COM.
419, 435 (1961).
70. Hurewitz, supra note68; see also Paul Dembling & Daniel Arons, supra note 70 (noting that the British
delegation argued in favor of allowing dual-use equipment on celestial bodies).
71. Dembling and Arons, supra note 70.
72. JEROME MORENOFF, WORLD PEACE THROUGH SPACE LA", 226 (1973).
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on the surface of a celestial body, such as the moon. 73 The military origin or potential
military use of a particular technology appears not to be a factor.74 WMDs are considered
aggressive and are therefore prohibited in space and on celestial bodies. 75 However,
non-aggressive military uses of outer space, as opposed to celestial bodies, are not prohib-
ited, 76 and military equipment and personnel may be used for peaceful purposes even on
the moon and other celestial bodies. 77 One commentator observed that space law, includ-
ing the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and
Under Water (the "Limited Test Ban Treaty"),78 the Outer Space Treaty, the Treaty on
the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (the "ABM Treaty"), 79 and the Moon
Agreement were developed to "permit, indeed to endorse, the arms race, including the
militarization of space."80 Supporters of this militarization theory rely on a fundamental
axiom of international law: "If an act is not specifically prohibited, then international law
permits it."81 In this regard Professor Alex Meyer notes:
Any use of space which does not itself constitute an attack upon, or stress against, the
territorial integrity and independence of another State, would be "permissible." Mili-
tary maneuvers in peacetime, the use of reconnaissance satellites, the testing of weap-
ons, the establishment of Military Orbiting Laboratories (MOLs), etc, would
therefore be also permissible in Outer Space. These activities belong to the so-called
"peaceful military activities. '8 2
In sum, the peaceful purposes provision set out in Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty
has been the subject of much analytical discussion as to its scope and meaning. While
there is general agreement, but not complete unanimity, among space law commentators
that this is directed against non-military rather than merely non-aggressive activities, the
reality has been different. It is undeniable that, in addition to the many commercial and
scientific uses, outer space has and continues to be used for an expanding array of military
activities. Unless concrete steps are taken to arrest this trend-which will require a signif-
icant shift in political will, particularly among the major powers of the world-it is likely
73. Dembling and Arons, supra note 70, 432-35.
74. Id. at 435.
75. Outer Space Treaty, mpra note 20, art. IV.
76. Although the Outer Space Treaty failed to delineate precisely which peaceful purposes were permissi-
ble, "one might conclude [from the Outer Space Treaty] that any military use of outer space must be re-
stricted to nonaggressive purpose." Dembling and Arons, snpra note 70, at 434.
77. "The use of any equipment or facility necessary for peaceful exploration of the moon and other celestial
bodies shall ... not be prohibited." Outer Space Treaty, supra note 20, art. IV(2). See also Hearings Before the
S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 81 (1967) (statement of Cyrus Vance, Deputy Secretary
of Defense). "The treaty does not mean that military personnel or equipment will be excluded from space.
Only weapons of mass destruction are barred from space."
78. Opened for signature Aug. 5, 1963, 480 U.N.T.S. 43 (Oct. 10, 1963).
79. ABM Treaty, supra note 5.
80. MIRCA MATTFESCo-MAm-E, A Treaty for "Star Peace' in 2 Arms Control and Disarmament in Outer
Space 189, 190 (Nicolas Matte ed., 1987).
81. Robert L. Bridge, International Law and Military Activities in Outer Space, 13 AKRON L. REv. 649, 658,
664 (1979); Morgan, supra note 58, at 300. See also Case of the "S.S. Lotus" (Fr. V. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J.
(ser.A) No. 10, (Jan. 4).
82. Bridge, supra note 82, at 658.
WINTER 2007
1104 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
that space will increasingly be utilized to further the military and strategic aims of specific
countries, particularly as military and space technology continues to evolve and develop.
In this context, if one were to adopt a hard-line pragmatic (and perhaps non-legal) view
of the current situation, one could suggest that the non-military versus non-aggressive
debate is a redundant argument even though it represents an extremely important issue of
interpretation of the strict principles set out in the Outer Space Treaty. Indeed, the focus
of much discussion now centers, as it should, on issues involving the weaponization of
space, as evident by the numerous United Nations General Assembly Resolutions on that
issue.83
In one sense, this assumes that the militarization of space is a given, as much as it pains
international and space lawyers to admit it. Of course, this is highly troubling and flies in
the face of the principles of the Outer Space Treaty. Yet, it would be naive to ignore the
realities. What must be done, instead, is to understand what legal principles currently
apply to any military activities in space and to provide, at least from a regulatory perspec-
tive, an appropriate framework to protect humankind from what could otherwise be
unimaginable scenarios. This involves consideration of the interaction between the ex-
isting rules of international space law and the jus ad bellum-the international laws relat-
ing to the legal regulation of the use of force.
IV. The Intersection of the Regime on Force and International Space Law
A. USE OF FORCE FN OUTER SPACE
The United Nations Charter prohibits the "threat or use of force against the territorial
integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with
the Purposes of the United Nations."84 The scope of this prohibition remains hotly con-
tested. The prevailing view is that this provision is an absolute bar to the use of force,
with the sole exceptions being self-defense (but only to the extent specified in Article 51)
and authorization by the Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the United Na-
tions Charter.85 Under the Outer Space Treaty, while the principle of self-defense re-
mains intact, the method of that defense is limited. A wide range of military activity,
however, may still fit under the self-defense umbrella.
Of significance with regard to the use of force is the reference in Article HI of the Outer
Space Treaty to the United Nations Charter (including article 51) and, in particular, its
express preservation of the right of states to use outer space in self-defense. Article III
provides perhaps the clearest indication that the international law of war-jus in bello-
will apply to space warfare:
83. Refer to the numerous United Nations General Assembly Resolutions, beginning with G.A. Res. 36/99,
U.N. Doc. A/RES/36/99 (Dec. 9, 1981) and culminating most recently with G.A. Res. 56/116, U.N. Doc. A/
RES/59/116, (Dec. 10, 2004), which have been directed towards the prevention of an arms race in outer
space. The political dimensions of this issue in the early 1980s were indicated by a split along ideological
grounds on the main thrust of these resolutions. See NANDASIRI JASENTI-ULIYANA, NTERNATIONAL SPACE
LAW AND THE UNITED NATIONs 82 (1999).
84. U.N. Charter, art. 2 4.
85. Robert A. Ramey, Armed Conflict on the Final Frontier: The Law of War in Space, 48 A.F. L. REv. 1, 60,62
(2002).
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States Parties to the Treaty shall carry on activities in the exploration and use of outer
space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, in accordance with international
law, including the Charter of the United Nations, in the interest of maintaining in-
ternational peace and security and promoting international co-operation and
understanding.86
Two significant observations arise from this provision. First, Article III applies the restric-
tions of all international law to outer space activities ("in accordance with"). As products
of "international law," this includes both the jus ad bellum and the jus in bello.8 7 As far as
its principles will apply to future technologies, the laws of war have been incorporated into
military space operations by virtue of the Outer Space Treaty. 8 A second observation
relates to the requirement that a State's exploration and use of outer space be "in the
interest of maintaining international peace and security," a cornerstone of the United Na-
tions Charter.8 9
The most relevant provisions of the Outer Space Treaty regarding weaponization of
space are Articles IV and IX. Major Douglas Anderson noted that "Paragraph 1 of Article
IV... is viewed by most commentators as only a limited disarmament provision." 90 Evi-
dence that the drafters only intended Article IV(I) to ban orbiting nuclear-type weapons
is indicated by the fact that the treaty does not prohibit the stationing of land-based inter-
continental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), even though their flight trajectory would take them
through outer space. 91 It is well established that the only specific limitation placed on the
use of the outer void space for military purposes is that found in Article IV().92 Professor
Bin Cheng asserts that "the outer void space as such can be used for any military activity
that is compatible with general international law and the Charter of the United Nations,
as long as no 'nuclear weapons or any other kind of weapons of mass destruction' are
stationed there." 93 The practical import of this analysis is captured in Major Douglas
Anderson's observation:
Under this .. .interpretation, none of the exotic future weapons systems currently
being proposed or researched by the United States would violate this provision of the
Outer Space Treaty. For instance, laser beam weapons are intended to destroy their
targets by delivering a high impulse shock that causes structural collapse of the rocket
booster or by remaining on the target until a hole is burned through the missile ...
86. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 20, art. HI.
87. Ramey, supra note 84, at 127.
88. For a detailed analysis of the relevance of the laws of war to the use of outer space, see Steven Freeland,
The Applicability of the Jus in Bello Rules of International Humanitarian Law to the Law of Outer Space, in 49
PROCEEDINGS OF THE COLLOQUIUM OF OLriER SPACE (2006).
89. Ramey, supra note 86, at 127.
90. Douglas S. Anderson, A Military Look Into Space: The Ultimate High Ground, 1995 ARMY LAW. 19, 23
(1995).
91. Other WMDs not relevant to the issue of planetary defense would be biological and chemical weapons.
Michael G. Gallagher, Legal Aspects of the Strategic Defense Initiative, 111 MIL. L. RE\v. 11, 41 (1986).
92. BIN CHIENG, STUDIES IN INt.RNAriONAL SPACE LAW 529 (1997).
93. Id.
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violations would only occur if any of the weapon systems included a nuclear explosion
to propel them or as a means of destroying a target.
94
Alongside the specific reference to the restriction of only particular weapons, Article IV is
the setting for much greater controversy. It provides for two separate legal regimes for
military activity in outer space: (1) activity conducted on the moon and other celestial
bodies; and (2) activity conducted in outer space itself. Article TV divides the extraterres-
trial universe into three parts: the Earth's orbit, celestial bodies, and outer space. This
then means that the Outer Space Treaty does not completely free all of outer space from
military use.
By its terms, military activity, including the deployment of anti-satellite weapons
(ASATs), is prohibited specifically on the moon and other celestial bodies. Outer space, as
such, remains open to military activity that is non-aggressive, that is, in line with the
United Nations Charter and international law, as long as such activity does not involve
nuclear weapons or WMDs. Professor Bin Cheng notes that subject to the second para-
graph of Article IV, "nothing in article iV(l) itself prohibits the stationing of any other
type of weapons in outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, or in fact
the use of outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, for military purposes
in any other way." 95 Although Article IV(2) does not prohibit the non-peaceful use of
outer space away from celestial bodies, such uses are nonetheless implicitly prohibited by
other provisions. 96 For example, at least to the extent that non-peaceful means the ag-
gressive use of force, such uses are prohibited by the United Nations Charter. 97 Article
IV also relates to the legal permissibility of satellite interceptors, such as the system appar-
ently recently tested by China and the missile shield system being developed by the
United States. ASATs deviate from the non-aggressive character of virtually all other
satellites and, in so doing, may appear to violate the non-aggressive mandate required of
all space activities under the peaceful purposes restriction. 98 One interpretation from a
military officer is as follows:
[R]egardless of their putative "destabilizing" character for international peace and
security, the Outer Space Treaty does not prohibit the transiting, or even the orbit-
ing, of conventional weaponry in space, including ASATs. The prohibition on orbit-
ing of weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons, strongly suggests the
distinction between those weapons, and conventional weapons of lesser destructive
power, including those directed at satellites. Though Article V(l) could easily be
modified to affect the de-weaponization of space, conventional weapons are not
proscribed. 9 9
From the foregoing, it can be deduced that Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty con-
templates the military use of space for scientific research and grants a carte blanche to
94. Anderson, supra note 91, at 24 ("[tlhe SDI provided a measure of legitimacy to many ideas that were
formerly seen as impossible").
95. Bin Cheng, The Legal Status of Outer Space and Relevant Issues: Delimitation of Outer Space and Definition
of"Peacefid Use", 11 J. SPACE L. 89, 101 (1983).
96. Rainey, supra note 83, at 82.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 83.
99. Id. at 84.
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civilian scientific applications. The reality is that civilian applications of space capabilities,
such as weather, navigation, communications, and remote sensing, are equally significant
for military purposes. In addition, as a technical matter, there is no clear line between
military missiles and civilian space launch vehicles, hence the difficulties caused by the
dual-use satellite phenomena. Technologies used to build sophisticated weaponry are
often similar or even identical to the technologies required for civilian space programs.' 0 0
However, this is not the extent of the problem. Just as states have been undertaking
what might be termed passive military activities in outer space since the advent of space
technology, outer space is increasingly being used as part of active engagement in the
conduct of armed conflict. Not only is the information gathered from outer space-
through, for example, the use of remote satellite technology and communications satel-
lites-used to plan military engagement on Earth, space assets are now used to direct
military activity and represent an integral part of the military hardware of the major
powers.
It was during the Gulf War in 1990 that the value of space assets to the conduct of war
was first utilized to a significant degree. Indeed, Operation Desert Storm was regarded as
the first space war. It was recognized that the use of space technology would create an
integrated battle platform to aid in the implementation of military strategies. Following
the attacks of September 11, 2001, the U.S. Administration issued a landmark policy pa-
per in which it emphasized the need for "[i]nnovation within the armed forces [which] will
rest on experimentation with new approaches to warfare, strengthening joint operations,
exploiting U.S. intelligence advantages, and taking full advantage of science and
technology."10 '
Ballistic missiles play an increasingly important role in any sophisticated national secur-
ity structure, and the development of defensive systems "is both a result of and additional
factor driving" a global arms race. 10 2 In 2001, a commission headed by Donald Rumsfeld
(who later served as United States Secretary of Defense from 2001 to 2006) suggested that
an "attack on elements of U.S. space systems during a crisis or conflict should not be
considered an improbable act."1 0 3 The European Union has recently identified outer
space as "a key component for its European Defense and Security Policy."1 04 Even for
smaller states such as Australia, one of the countries that very quickly voiced public con-
cerns at the Chinese missile test, the political exigencies of a post-September 11 world
have significantly altered the landscape of national space policy, which now highlights the
military and national security concerns associated with the use of outer space.' 0 5
100. Hurewitz, supra note 68, at 228 ("the differences relate to intentions, not capabilities").
101. The White House, supra note 29.
102. Regina Hagen & Jirgen Scheffran, International Space Law and Space Security - Expectations and Criteria
for a Sustainable and Peacefid Use of Outer Space, in 2 ESSEI'iIAL AIR AND SPACE 273 (2005).
103. U.S. Dep't of Defense, REPORT OF THEi COVMiSSION TO ASSESS UNITED STATEs NAT IONAL SECUR-
I'-- SPACE MANAG IMENT AND ORGANIZATION, 8 (Jan. 11, 2001), available at http://Maxwell.af.mil/au.awc/
space coinnission/executivesummary.pdf.
104. Hagen & Scheffran, supra note 103, at 281-82.
105. For a discussion of Australia's space policy, see Steven Freeland, Difficudties of Implementing National
Space Legislation Exemplified by the Australian Approach, in "PROJECT 2001 PLus"-GLOBAL AND EUROPEAN
CHALLENGED FOR AIR AND SPACE LAW AT THE EDGE OF THE 21si CENTURY 65-92 (Stephan Hobe,
Bernhard Schinidt-Tedd & Kai-Uwe Schrogl eds., 2006).
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The increasing acceptance of military practices, coupled with the explicit legal encour-
agement for civilian endeavors in outer space, provides a strong argument that militariza-
tion of space through placement of non-nuclear and other weapons of destruction is in
and of itself permissible under the space law regime. Richard A. Morgan asserts that
"most experts ... agree that the Outer Space Treaty does not prohibit 'military use' of
space." 0 6 He goes on to note that there is a "consensus, within the United Nations that
'peaceful' more specifically equates to 'non-aggressive"'. 107 However, the general stance
of the commentators noted by Morgan is at odds with the Conference on Disarmament's
observation in 1986 that "[n]o country should develop, test or deploy space weapons in
any form."1 8
In sum, despite the use for peaceful purposes centerpiece of the space law regime, key
provisions readily lend themselves to interpretations that would support many aspects of
the militarization and weaponization of space. Thus, the matter is open and dependent on
the perspective that a state adopts, since there is a perception that the elastic nature of the
international space law regime can be made to fit several (perhaps conflicting) analyses.
Therefore, as previously argued, the other applicable legal regimes that also relate to the
military uses and weaponization of outer space are perhaps of even greater contemporary
practical relevance than the "golden peaceful purposes rule" outlined in the space treaties.
In this context, the authors now turn to consider the Limited Test Ban Treaty, whose
terms focused only on prohibiting nuclear detonations in space. Little thought and atten-
tion seems to have been given to ensuring that the treaty effectively prevented space from
being turned from a sanctuary of peaceful science into a battleground that may one day
offer opportunities for offensive and defensive non-nuclear weapons. Indeed, it seems that
was clearly not the intention of the treaty. The ban focuses exclusively on nuclear weap-
ons, meaning that other forms of weapons such as conventional, biological, chemical, or
high energy laser weapons can be deployed without breaching the treaty.10 9 In addition,
to the extent that nuclear power sources operate by means other than explosion, the treaty
does not prohibit their use.110 This means that the testing and deployment of
non-nuclear based ASATs and SOVs with combat capabilities are not prohibited.
The treaty gives rise to three significant implications for space warfare, as synthesized
by Major Ramey:
1. First, while the treaty prohibits all nuclear detonations in space, even those that
may have value for peaceful military or scientific purposes, it does not regulate deto-
nations of a non-nuclear nature.
2. Second, because the treaty outlaws "any nuclear weapon test explosion, or any
other nuclear explosion," it may prohibit the use of nuclear fission as a means of space
propulsion.
3. Finally, the Treaty also prohibits the use of nuclear explosions for non-testing
purposes as well." 1
106. Morgan, supra note 58, at 303.
107. Id.
108. Conference on Disarmament, Final Record of the Three Hundred and Fiftieth Plenary Meeting, U.N.
Doc. CD/PV.350 (1986).
109. Ramey, supra note 86, at 100-01.
110. Id. at 101.
111. Id.
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Another principal treaty, the bilateral ABM Treaty, provides that "[e]ach party undertakes
not to develop, test, or deploy ABM systems or components which are sea-based,
air-based, space-based, or mobile land-based."'' 2 Although there were no space-based
ABM systems in existence when the treaty was adopted in 1972, the respective space pro-
gram of each party was highly advanced, and each could foresee the use of such systems.'113
Article XII of this treaty is perhaps even more significant to the long-term use of space by
military systems, beyond the narrower question of ABM systems. It provides:
1. For the purpose of providing assurance of compliance with the provisions of this
Treaty, each Party shall use national technical means of verification at its disposal in a
manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law.
2. Each Party undertakes not to interfere with the national technical means of verifi-
cation of the other Party operating in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article.' 14
Paragraph one is significant. Although the legality of military surveillance activity in space
was established in international law previous to the ABM Treaty, the treaty gave formal
sanction to the practice by the two leading space-faring states. In particular, it acknowl-
edged the legality of space-based surveillance via satellite and entrenched this as "an es-
sential component of the international arms-control regime."'' 15
While the ABM Treaty bans missile defenses, it makes no mention of the ASAT, a
device that has been in the process of development for over 20 years. Under the ABM
Treaty, "anti-satellite weapons remain unrestricted."" 6 While no language in the ABM
Treaty expressly restricts ASAT development or testing, special problems may arise be-
cause of the operational similarity between the ABM and the ASAT." 7 The American
ASAT consists of a two-stage rocket (a sensor and a war-head)."18 The ASAT's
heat-seeking homing sensor picks up the heat of the target satellite as the ASAT travels
through space, intercepting the target with the warhead then destroying it. On the other
hand, the Soviet ASAT is launched by rocket into the orbit of the targeted satellite and
explodes in proximity to the target, destroying the satellite." 9
Because ASAT and ABM technologies overlap, continued development of ASAT tech-
nology would in all likelihood have amounted to contravention of the ABM Treaty since
Article V prohibits developing, testing, or deploying ABM systems or components. In-
deed, as the United States attempted to consolidate its policy of space control through its
ongoing pursuit of a national missile shield system, the United States ultimately formed
the view that the development and testing of the system meant that it had little choice but
to withdraw from the ABM Treaty in 2002.
112. ABM Treaty, supra note 5, art. V, para. 1. An anti-ballistic missile (ABM) is a device that can destroy an
ICBM in flight. Kurt Gottfried, A Backfiring Weapon, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 1983, at A23.
113. See Glenn H. Reynolds & Robert P. Merges, OUTER SPACE PROBLEM OF LAW AND POLICY 97 (2d ed.
1997).
114. ABM Treaty, sopra note 5, art. XII paras. 1-2 (emphasis added).
115. Reynolds & Merges, svpra note 114, at 97.
116. Peter A. Clausen, Courting a New Arms Race, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 1984, at A3 1.
117. See Gottfried, snpra note 113.
118. John Pike, Anti-Satellite Weapons and Arms Control, 13 ARMS CON'IrROL TODAY 1, 4 (1983).
119. Id.
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Assuming ASATs will be used for ASAT purposes (i.e. destroying targeted satellites),
and not for later conversion into ABMs, the ABM Treaty does not limit ASAT use.120
However, an ASAT that could be converted into an ABM might be considered an ABM
system component for Article V purposes and, as a result, may violate the terms of the
ABM Treaty. 121 From a practical point of view, an aggressive ASAT deployment program
could be viewed by an adversary as a mechanism to boost ABMs.122 As a result, "ASATs
could therefore trigger enormous buildups of offensive missiles, which are precisely what
the ABM Treaty was designed to prevent." 23 In this regard, ASATs and other SOVs with
the capability to deploy ordinances from space deviate from the non-aggressive character
of satellites and, in so doing, may appear to violate the non-aggressive mandate required
of all space activities under the peaceful purposes restriction.
The crux of the matter is that the "Outer Space Treaty does not [explicitly] prohibit the
transiting, or even the orbiting, of conventional weaponry in space." 124 This has been
seized upon by those who assert the existence of a legal right to deploy certain types of
weapons systems in outer space. As Major Ramey argues:.
The prohibition on orbiting of WMDs, including nuclear weapons, strongly suggests
the distinction between those weapons, and conventional weapons of lesser destruc-
tive power, including those directed at satellites. Though Article IV (1) could easily
be modified to affect the de-weaponization of space, conventional weapons are not
proscribed.125
Professor Ian Brownlie proposes that weapons that do not employ the force of shock
waves and heat associated with more orthodox weapons may nevertheless be assimilated to
the use of force on two grounds: "In the first place the agencies concerned are commonly
referred to as 'weapons' and forms of 'warfare' . . . [and] the second consideration [is] the
fact that these weapons are employed for the destruction of life and property." 26
As Petras notes:
What's more, regardless of whether a satellite is struck by an ASAT weapon (be it a
nuclear burst, kinetic weapon or high-energy particle beam) or a computer virus, the
effect is the same - crippling of the satellite and/or its function. Under Brownlie's
formulation then, cyber - attack on a satellite does indeed equate to the use of armed
force ... Thus, though space weapons were not actively envisaged during the drafting
of the United Nations Charter, whether a satellite is struck by an ASAT weapon or
ordnances are deployed by an SOV, under Brownlie's formulation this cyber-attack
would equate to the use of armed force.127
A key issue is the matter of the use or threat of force. It is inconceivable that deployment
of ASATs or SOVs would be seen as a benign activity given that they are offensive in
120. Halpern, supra note 65, at 191.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Gottfried, supra note 113.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Ian Brownlie, INTERNhATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY SiiES 362 (1963).
127. Petras, supra note 43, at 1259.
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character. Thus, under the regime on the use of force, mere deployment of this weaponry
can amount to the threat of the use of force, particularly where space weaponry is hoisted
to the same orbital plane as another state's space assets. This is even more so if it occurs
in circumstances where the States are on a war footing or involved in a militarily volatile
situation. The testing of the weapons or military maneuvers under these circumstances
would compound the matter. Major Anderson offers the observation that:
All forms of military, and not only 'warlike,' uses of outer space, including defensive
activities, are in conflict with the clearly established principle set forth in Article I(1)
of the Space Treaty. Nonaggressive, or defensive, uses of outer space cannot be law-
ful since most all existing states have agreed on that principle.'
28
B. CYBER-ArTACK AS AN "ARMED ArrACK"
1. The Use or Threat of Force Paradigm
Under Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter, states may neither use force in the
course of their international relations nor threaten to do so. Historically, defining the
precise meaning of the force prohibited by the Charter, particularly given the many
sources of pressure (including economic, political, military, etc.) nations may use in their
relations with each other, has always been difficult. It is widely recognized, however, that
the prohibition excludes many forms of non-military physical force 129 but encompasses
both direct and indirect military force. In this regard, Major Ramey notes that "[g]iven the
fact that space warfare will require new application of existing legal regimes, if not new
regimes altogether, new means and methods of using force will also give rise to new means
of making threats, including those from space."
130
It is not difficult to conceive of scenarios where the use of armed force in space would
potentially cause "harmful interference" with other states in their peaceful exploration and
use of space, possibly also bringing into play the consultation requirements specified in
Article LIX of the Outer Space Treaty.13 1 For example, the recent Chinese "killer missile"
test would have led to a significant amount of space debris from the destruction of the
redundant weather satellite, which has the potential to adversely affect the space activities
128. Anderson, shupra note 95, at 26.
129. Albrecht Randelzhofer, Article 2(4), in THE CHARIER OF IHE UNITE) NATIONS: A COAMIENTARY
116, at 112-113 (B. Simma et al. eds., 1994). While these forms of coercion may not constitute "force" under
Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter, their use may violate the general principle of non-intervention.
130. Ramey, supra note 86, at 61.
131. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 20, art. IX (providing, in part:
If a State Party to the Treaty has reason to believe that an activity or
experiment planned by it or its nationals in outer space, including the Moon and other celestial
bodies, would cause potentially harmful interference with activities of other States Parties in the
peaceful exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, it shall
undertake appropriate international consultations before proceeding with any such activity or
experiment. A State Party to the Treaty which has reason to believe that an activity or experiment
planned by another State Party in outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies,
would cause potentially harmful interference with activities in the peaceful exploration and use of
outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, may request consultation concerning
the activity or experiment.)
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of other states as well as possibly giving rise to a claim for damages under the Liability
Convention. 32
In 1995, a study for the USAF analyzing the future of air and space power reported that
a combination of high radio frequency power and large antenna technology would allow
for the projection of extremely high power densities and electromagnetic radiation.'33
The Report suggested that such a weapon in geo-synchronous orbit could create a six mile
footprint on a battlefield, which would "blank out" all radar receivers and damage all
unprotected communication sets within that area.' 34 As the report shows, there are myr-
iad activities in outer space that have the potential to meet the threshold of a threat of
force. Consider, for example, the use of space assets to jam radar, military communica-
tion, and/or electronic gathering facilities. To what extent can generation of an electronic
footprint that jams such facilities crucial to military command systems be considered a use
or threat of use of force within the prohibitions under international law? The matter is
probably quite clear-cut in the context of hostilities, but is far from certain in non-hostile
situations.
Could a country consider the deliberate blanking out of its communication systems as a
military strategy of an opponent seeking to test its command systems and thus as a threat
of use of force that could justify retaliatory actions such as the deployment of an ASAT,
laser, or other electromagnetic weaponry? These are crucial questions, all the more so
because they are of practical relevance rather than remaining in the realm of mere aca-
demic curiosity considering, for example, that USSPACECOM's long-range plan encom-
passes space control articulated as "the ability to ensure un-interrupted access to space for
U.S. forces and our allies, freedom of operations within the space medium and an ability
to deny others the use of space, if required."1 35 Translated into legal terms, attempts to
"ensure un-interrupted access to space" and to maintain "an ability to deny others the use
of space" 136 are expressions encompassing military force or at least the threat thereof.
Naturally this strategy has a number of worrying consequences, not the least of which is to
encourage other major space-faring powers to focus on their own military technology in
order to (attempt to) keep on par with the United States. This has a snow-ball effect, with
the tendency of the United States and other major militarized powers to ever increasingly
rely on space technology, potentially spiraling into a space weapons race despite the best
diplomatic efforts of the international community to prevent this. Even though the
United States may currently be in a position to claim space superiority, it can only be a
matter of time before other space-faring countries, perhaps China and India, will develop
equally sophisticated and potentially devastating space weapons technology. Indeed, the
recent Chinese test seems to indicate that we are already approaching that point.
132. Article 1(a) of the Liability Convention, supra note 20, defines "damage" as follows: 'loss of life, per-
sonal injury or other impairment of health; or loss of or damage to property of States or of persons, natural or
juridical, or property of international intergovernmental organizations'.
133. Ivan Bekey, Force Projection from Space, in (unnumbered Space Applications Volume) NEW WORLD
VISTAS: AIR AND SPACE POWER FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 83, 83-84 (1995).
134. Id. at 85. With respect to information warfare, the report gives a number of examples: network viruses,
disinformation, memory erasures, and false signals.
135. U.S. SPACE COMMAND, supra note 11, at 21.
136. Id.
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2. The Armed Attack Paradigm
Perhaps the biggest question with respect to the self-defense principle embodied in
Article 51 relates to the meaning of the phrase "if an armed attack occurs." Article 51 of
the United Nations Charter provides that the inherent right of self-defense is expressly
linked to an armed attack.' 37 A literal reading of the prohibition in the Charter, and a
view that many subscribe to in denying any alleged right of pre-emptive strike or anticipa-
tory self-defense (discussed in section (c) below), seems to preclude the right to defend
with arms until an actual armed attack has occurred. Yet, as the International Court of
Justice noted in the case of Nicaragua v. United States-although in that case it was ulti-
mately considering the customary international law position as opposed to the position
under the Charter-"a definition of the 'armed attack' which, if found to exist, authorises
the exercise of the 'inherent right' of self-defence, is not provided in the Charter, and is
not part of treaty law." 138
Consequently, it is necessary to determine whether a cyber-attack constitutes an armed
attack justifying self-defense within the framework of Article 51. At first glance, a
cyber-attack can be objectively likened to armed force. This necessitates some textual
interpretation in line with the United Nations Charter to see whether this actually fits
within the international regime on the use of force.
An armed attack clearly implies the use of arms or military force and constitutes an
action of an offensive, destructive, and illegal nature.' 39 Significant in this regard is the
"Definition of Aggression" adopted by the United Nations General Assembly through
Resolution 3314.140 Article 1 of that Resolution defines aggression as the "use of armed
force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of
another State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Na-
tions, as set out in this Definition." 14 1
To the extent that non-peaceful means the aggressive use of force, such uses are prohib-
ited by the United Nations Charter when undertaken by a state. Article 3 of Resolution
3314 enumerates specific acts that amount to acts of aggression "regardless of a declara-
tion of war." The text of the Resolution makes it clear that it is intended to serve as a
guide to the Security Council in determining the existence of aggression under Article 39
of the Charter and not as a definition of armed attack. 42 Nevertheless, if an armed attack
is understood to be a type of aggression that justifies self-defense under Article 51-that
is, "une agression arm~e" (or "aggression which is armed")14 3-then the definition of ag-
gression in the Resolution and the specific acts of aggression enumerated in Article 3 are
at least illustrative of the types of circumstances where recourse to self-defense is
vindicated.144
137. U.N. Charter, art. 51.
138. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Merits) (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 14 I.Cj. 94, 105 (Jun. 27).
139. J. NAGENDRA SINGH, USE OF FORCE UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 15 (1984).
140. Definition of Aggression, G.A. Res. 3314, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., 2319th plen. mtg.,Supp. No. 31,
U.N. Doe. A/9631 (Dec. 14, 1974).
141. Id.
142. Id, at pmbl., art. 6.
143. YoRuXe D[NsrE1N, WAR, Ac.GRESSION, AND SELF-DEFENCE 166 (2001).
144. Randelzhofer, supra note 129, at 668, (asserting that "aggression" as defined in Resolution 3314 does
not coincide with the notion of "armed attack" under U.N. Charter art. 5).
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It is significant, although somewhat perplexing, that the international space law regime
at the same time provides both that states have a right to deploy satellites and proscribes
any harmful interference with their "activities in the peaceful exploration and use of outer
space." 45 In this regard, the use of ASATs or Direct Energy Weapons-primarily lasers-
on a State's satellites could either be a use of armed force by a state against the sovereignty
of another state or equated with the with the use of weapons by a state against the terri-
tory of another state. It is thus clear that the cyber-attack cannot be justified as
self-defense, at least in the absence of any prior action by the victim state in targeting
another state's satellites. Any action absent such prior attack can itself be inferred to con-
stitute an armed attack within the meaning of Article 51. This would at the very least
include the laser blinding of satellites and certainly the deployment of hyper-velocity ki-
netic weapons. Of even more technical and legal uncertainty is the question of whether
detonations in an orbital plane that generate Electro-Magnetic Pulse (EMP) or Van Allen
radiation belts that impair the operation of satellites of a third state would constitute an
armed attack.
Despite the provisions of the Outer Space Treaty prescribing the peaceful use and ex-
ploration of space, the Liability Convention recognizes the distinct possibility that States
may engage in intentional damage to space objects.' 46 The Liability Convention aims to
elaborate "effective international rules and procedures concerning liability for damage
caused by space objects and to ensure, in particular, the prompt payment under the terms
of this Convention of a full and equitable measure of compensation to victims of such
damage."14 7
To the extent that a hostile act in space, whether lawful or not, could harmfully interfere
with a third party state's asset, Article IX of the Outer Space Treaty requires that the state
must be consulted. Further, unlike other space treaties and UN resolutions that leave the
timing of such consultations unclear, Article IX specifies that it must occur "before pro-
ceeding with any such activity or experiment." 148 This could create a disincentive to car-
rying out activities involving military interference with a third-party state's military
objects since prior consultations with a third-party state could, by public dissemination or
otherwise, constitute a de facto notification to the opposing belligerent state of the antici-
pated attack. Nonetheless, Article IX does not stand in the way of carrying through with
such hostile acts once consultations have occurred, even if the third-party state objects to
the anticipated activity or experiment.
A careful reading of the Liability Convention discloses that the corpus juris spatialis
implicitly recognizes that under certain circumstances the intentional destruction of space
objects might occur.' 49 The Liability Convention subjects states' parties to absolute lia-
bility for damage caused by its space objects on the earth's surface or to an aircraft in
145. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 20, at art. IX.
146. Article VI(l) of the Liability Convention, supra note 20, provides for exoneration from absolute liability
under the treaty in circumstances inter alia where the claimant state, or a natural or juridical person that it
represents, has committed "an act or omission done with intent to cause damage'.
147. For a detailed analysis of the underlying goals of the Liability Convention as well as its principal terms,
see Steven Freeland, There's a Satellite in my Backyard!- MIR and the Convention on International Liability for
Damage Caused by Space Objects, 24(2) U. NEw S. WAES LJ. 462, 470 (2001).
148. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 20, at art. IX.
149. Hurwitz, supra note 52, at 148-50.
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flight 5 0 and to liability based on fault for damage by its space object to the space object of
another state "being caused elsewhere than on the surface of the earth."' 5' However Ma-
jor Ramey flags the possibility that, far from the Liability Convention being simply a
matter of claim and compensation in a classical tortuous scenario, one can read into the
"with intent to cause damage" phrase specified in Article VI a tacit acknowledgment that
in certain instances force may be used by third states. 152
As Major Ramey notes:
Article VI provides exoneraion from absolute liability in cases where either the
claimant State, or the natural or juridical persons it represents, caused the damage
wholly or partially by gross negligence, or an act or omission done with intent to
cause damage. A proper understanding of the phrase "intent to cause damage" pro-
vides insight into the Convention's foresight as to the possibility of uses of force
against space objects. Thus the Liability Convention is likely to have only a tangential
relationship to the regulation of space warfare a role in regard to space warfare.3
C. ANrICIPATORY SELF-DEFENSE AND WMDs-A NEW CALCULUS
In the Nicaragua Case, the International Court of Justice was faced with the need to
supplement the Charter jus ad bellum provisions with the corresponding principles of
customary international law. 15 4 Indeed, the Court was precluded from considering the
United States' obligations under the United Nations Charter by virtue of that country's
restrictions to its acceptance of the Court's jurisdiction under Article 36(2) of the Statute
of the International Court of Justice.15 5 Traditionally, the customary international law
principles associated with self-defense stemmed from circumstances where the defending
state was not required to "absorb the first hit." Instead, the doctrine of anticipatory or
pre-emptive self-defense, as developed historically, only required a clear and imminent
danger of attack. The question is whether anticipatory self-defense is currently recog-
150. Liability Convention, supra note 40, art. II.
151. Id. art. III.
152. Id. art. VI(l) (2) (providing for an exoneration from absolute liability where the damage has resulted
inter alia "from an act or omission done with intent to cause damage on the part of a claimant State or of
natural or juridical persons it represents." Such exoneration does not, however, apply "where the damage has
resulted from activities conducted by a launching State which are not in conformity with international law
including, in particular, the Charter of the United Nations and the [Outer Space Treaty]").
153. Ramey, supra note 86, at 135 (emphasis added).
154. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Merits) (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.CJ. 14, 176 (June 27) ; Christine
Gray, INTERNATIiONAL LAW AND THE UsE OF FORCE 154 (2000).
155. Statute of the International Court ofJustice art. 36(2),Jun. 26, 1945, 6 U.N. Doc. A/Conf.62/122. The
Statute provides:
The states parties to the present Statute may at any time declare that they recognize as compul-
sory ipso facto and without special agreement, in relation to any other state accepting the same
obligation, the jurisdiction of the Court in all legal disputes concerning:
a. the interpretation of a treaty;
b. any question of international law;
c. the existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a breach of an international
obligation;
d. the nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the breach of an international
obligation.
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nized at customary international law, particularly considering that the United Nations
Charter seemingly discounts the notion. However, the matter is not that simple in light of
the split between the restrictionist and counter-restrictionist views of anticipatory
self-defense referred to earlier.
It is contended by some commentators that the right to respond with force in
self-defense, even to a triggering act that has already occurred, is temporally limited. As
the Caroline incident indicated, the emergence of the customary right of self-defense
apparently involved a requirement of immediate action. Were the position otherwise,
there would be a strong argument the use of force is nothing more than a reprisal, which,
while perhaps permitted under limited circumstances by customary international law, is
prohibited by the United Nations Charter. Perhaps, particularly bearing in mind the re-
sponsibility of an attacked state to first determine without doubt who was responsible for
the attack, the temporal limitation associated with an act of self-defense has become more
of a balancing exercise. An indication of this development is the recent decision of the
International Court of Justice in the Oil Platforms Case, where the requirement of imme-
diacy was not specifically emphasized as a necessary pre-requisite to a lawful act of self-
defense in every case.1 56
Looked at from another viewpoint, it could be asserted that this previously narrower
technical interpretation ignores the fact that international law cannot compel any state to
wait until it absorbs a devastating or lethal first strike before acting to protect itself. Stra-
tegic circumstances and the consequences of surprise attacks have changed a great deal
since the Caroline incident. Today, in an age of chemicalbiologicab/nuclear weaponry,
the time and capability available to a vulnerable state could be very limited indeed.
How long can a country afford to wait when innovations in technology now point to a
situation where a surprise attack may be preceded by an elaborate tactical scheme that
jams military communications and blinds satellites, thus crippling the state's intelligence
gathering, early warning and battlefield capabilities? Some scholars believe that a right of
truly anticipatory self-defense has emerged outside of Article 51 in light of the availability
of VvMDs. 157 Professor Thomas Franck, in discussing WMAlDs in the context of terror-
ism, presents a position that is equally applicable to the emergence of a viable doctrine of
anticipatory self-defense and, in the authors' views, also to space weaponization: "the
transformation of weaponry to instruments of overwhelming and instant destruction ...
[brings] into question the conditionality of art 51, which limits states' exercise of the right
of self-defense to the aftermath of an armed attack. Inevitably, first-strike capabilities
begat a doctrine of 'anticipatory self-defence."'1 5s Professor Christopher Greenwood
weighs in-also along the terrorism continuum but once again with resonance to the
weaponization of outer space-with the observation that in a nuclear age, it is the poten-
tially devastating consequences of prohibiting self-defense unless an armed attack has al-
ready occurred that leads one to prefer the interpretation permitting anticipatory
self-defense. He argues that this
156. Oil Platforms (Merits) (Iran v. U.S.), 2003 I.CJ. 161, 329-34 (Nov. 6).
157. DerekW. Bowett, SELF-DEFENCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 191-2 (1958); see also RichardJ. Erickson,
LEGrTiMATE USE OF FORCE AGAINST STATE SPONSORED TERRORISm 142-3 (1989).
158. Thomas Franck, When, if Eve,r May States Deploy Military Force Without Prior Security CouncilAuthoriza-
tion?, 5 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 51, 57-8 (2001).
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accords better with State practice and with the realities of modern military conditions
than with the more restrictive interpretation of Article 51, which would confine the
right of self-defence to cases in which an armed attack had already occurred-al-
though it has to be said that, as a matter of simple construction of the words alone,
another conclusion might be reached.15 9
Perhaps the specific prohibition relating to WMDs in Article WY of the Outer Space
Treaty may further strengthen the rights of a state vulnerable to an attack by such weap-
ons in space. In any event, the arguments above are persuasive, particularly when one
considers that, shortly after the birth of the United Nations Charter, the Atomic Energy
Commission (AEC) suggested in its First Report in December 1946 that preparation for
atomic warfare in breach of a multilateral treaty or convention would, in view of the ap-
palling power of the weapon, have to be treated as an "armed attack" within Article 51 of
the United Nations Charter.' 60 Specifically, the AEC made the following recommenda-
tions to the United Nations Security Council about the control of nuclear energy and
nuclear weapons: "The development and use of atomic energy are not essentially matters
of domestic concern of the individual nations, but rather have predominantly international
implications and repercussions." 16'
The impact of WMDs on the modern self-defense principles appears to be the basis
upon which some commentators have concluded that a doctrine permitting certain antici-
patory self-defense actions is available to states. 162 True anticipatory self-defense would
permit the use of force "[i]f a state has developed the capability of inflicting substantial
harm upon another, indicated explicitly or implicitly its willingness or intent to do so, and
to all appearances is waiting only for the opportunity to strike."163
The authors contend that these emerging practical realities pointing to the assertion by
an increasing number of states of a right of anticipatory self-defense are also relevant to
emerging outer space military technologies and capabilities, bringing into play the re-
quirements encapsulated in Article IX of the Outer Space Treaty. As previously men-
tioned, that provision relates to a state's duty in non-hostile situations to engage in
"international consultations" prior to engaging in activities that the state "has reason to
believe ...would cause potentially harmful interference with activities of other States
Parties in the peaceful exploration and use of outer space...,164
159. Christopher Greenwood, International Law and the Pre-Emptive Use of Military Force: Afghanistan, Al
Qaida and Iraq, 4 SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J. 12, 15 (2003).
160. See generally Claud Waldock, The Regulation of the Use of Force by Individual States in International Law, 2
RECUEIL DES COURs 451, 498 (1952).
161. Leo Van Den Hole, Anticipatory Self-Defence Under International Law 19 Am. U. LNr'L L. REV. 69, 91
(2003).
162. See, e.g., Erickson, supra note 158, at 149 ( arguing that "anticipatory self-defence can be a legal justifi-
cation for the use of armed force.").
163. Michael Glennon, The Fog of Law: Self-Defense, Inherence, and Incoherence in Article 51 of the United
Nations Charter, 25 -kRV. J.L. & PuB. POL'y 539, 552 (2002).
164. Outer Space Treaty, snpra note 20, art IX. As a practical matter, as far as the authors are aware, no such
consultation has ever been undertaken at a formal level since the adoption of the Outer Space Treaty in 1967.
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V. Concluding Remarks
The legal regulation of humankind's activities in outer space poses some difficult dilem-
mas. On the one hand, it calls for specialized and specific rules to address the unique
characteristics of outer space, which are, of course, very different from the terrestrial envi-
ronment. As a result, as the United Nations has itself recognized,
[a]s is appropriate to an environment whose nature is so extraordinary, the extension
of international law to outer space has been gradual and evolutionary-commencing
with the study of questions relating to legal aspects, proceeding to the formulation of
principles of a legal nature and, then, incorporating such principles in general multi-
lateral treaties. 165
On the other hand, in the face of the significant advances in space technology-includ-
ing the development of space weaponization systems-that have left the legal principles
lagging behind, we should strongly champion the position that international space law is
not a legal system independent from the law that governs on earth and that important
terrestrial legal principles intended to promote peace and security should also be applica-
ble.' 66 As Stacey Lowder observed, "[s]ince its beginning, international law has adhered
to no intrinsic geographical limits."1 6
7
Indeed, the terms of the Outer Space Treaty, reflecting three significant General As-
sembly resolutions from the 1960s, support the position that ground rules must be ob-
served in the exploration and the use of outer space, particularly in the absence of specific
space law rules. 168 These rules include the jus ad bellum principles regulating the use of
force as well as the jus in bello principles that reflect the laws and customs of war. Respect
for both of these sets of principles is absolutely vital to the safety and security of human-
kind as well as the interests of future generations.
Yet the combination (and culmination) of these two approaches to the legal regulation
of outer space-specific rules as and when agreed by the international community and the
translation of principles developed for terrestrial regulation to outer space-still leaves
much room for uncertainty and exploitation for military and strategic purposes. As a re-
sult, if we are to avoid grey areas in the law, it is necessary to develop specific and clear
rules and standards that categorically sanction the weaponization of all of outer space as
well as the engagement in any form of conflict in the region of space and against space
assets.
This may require additional space law regulation directly applicable to armed conflict
and the use of force involving space technology. As part of these new rules, clear defini-
tions need to be developed for concepts such as "space weapons," "peaceful purposes," and
"military uses." Moreover, the fundamental issue of where space begins should be defini-
165. United Nations General Assembly, United Nations Treaties and Principles on Outer Space at v., U.N. Doc.
ST/SPACE/I 1, U.N. Sales no. E. 02.1.20 (2002).
166. CHENG, supra note 93, at 98-100.
167. Stacey L. Lowder, A State's International Legal Role: From The Earth To The Moon, 7 TULSA J. COMP. &
INT'L L. 253, 256 (1999).
168. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 20, art. II, 1H and IV; International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses
of Outer Space, supra note 18; Question of General and Complete Disarmament, G.A- Res. 1884, U.N.
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tively resolved so as to counter any arguments that outer space is, in fact, an area akin to
the territory of a state for the purposes of national security. Above all, in developing these
new rules, we need to adhere strictly to the collective humanity principles of space law in
order to avoid the possibility of alternate scenarios too frightening to contemplate.
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